The following chapters reassess the policies, practices, and representations of slavetrade suppression by building upon developments in research in political, legal and humanitarian history, naval, imperial and maritime history, medical history, race relations and migration, abolitionist literature and art, nineteenth-century geography, nautical literature and art, and representations of Africa. Topics that this book encompass are accordingly varied, and include: the origins and implementation of the suppression policy; the rise of 'anti-coercionist' challenges to naval deployment in West Africa in the mid-nineteenth-
1 These works mainly focus upon the economic and political shaping of all or certain parts of the Atlantic world, often with particular attention to questions of international diplomacy and law. 2 Discussions by maritime and slave-tradehistorians, centred on the policies and practices of arresting the commerce, have hitherto tended to fall back on accounts by the naval historians Christopher Lloyd (1949) and W.E.F Ward (1969) , 3 while the cultural significance of slave-trade suppression in nineteenth-century Britain has received little attention despite the increase in studies of this dimension ofslavery and abolition. 4 Lloyd's and Ward's accounts contain much useful anecdotal information, and both are particularly strong in detailing the suffering of naval crews chasing 'slavers' in West Africa. However, both are written in admiring tones which assume humanitarian motives for naval suppression as much as they presume patriotic pride on behalf of the reader. They encourage the understanding of slave-trade suppression as an end-point, a self-satisfied conclusion, in triumphalist narratives of Britain's emergence as a leading anti-slavery nation. particularly old slow-going tub in the Navy she was sure to be sent to the coast of Africa to try and catch the fast sailing American clippers' needs to be read in context as a hyperbolic complaint to Russell about the Admiralty's frustration of his plans. 14 Naval historians have nevertheless agreed that the navy was for the most part ill-provisioned to perform its task. In most years, the squadron that patrolled the West African coast was too small, and its ships too old or low-rating, to offer a major threat to illegal slave trading. And yet the military inadequacy of the force does not negate the surprising cost and commitment to suppression throughout a period of fiscal retrenchment. 15 In the first section of this book, Richard Huzzey traces the political debates which framed legal and diplomatic policies for the British state's waning but unbroken commitment to slave-trade suppression. He considers the popularity of this campaign and assesses the motives of subsequent generations of politicians who maintained, and occasionally challenged, the anti-slave-trade patrols.
One of the main aims of this volume is to come to a more nuanced understanding of the motivations behind Britain's anti-slave-trade policies and actions. This entails studying the work of slave-trade suppression with awareness of its political motivations and repercussions, its practical difficulties and the impact of these on enslaved peoples, former slaves, and naval sailors, and the broader cultural and ideological framework of the political and practical considerations of the campaign. Far from discounting morality as a motivating 7 factor, we seek to examine how moral motives might figure in this context. Lloyd's view that the squadron was launched out of 'purely philanthropic motives' understates the complexity and the momentousness of Britain's transition from leading poacher to gamekeeper of the slave trade, for the nation as a whole (or at least its vocal minority), and for the navy as an institution. 16 Prior to 1807, the navy had looked favourably upon the slave trade as a 'nursery' for seamen helping to preserve naval supremacy, especially at times of war. Naval To understand morality as one contingent and conditional factor among several others, including less savoury incentives such as prize monies, is to treat the human agents of Britain's anti-slave-trade initiatives as three-dimensional beings acting in a moment of complicated historical change. If at times the humans seem less than humane, then they seem no less human for it. Indeed, the moralistic interpretation of events tends to represent naval personnel assigned to anti-slave-trade policing as unreflexive, and, in more ways than one,self-less agents of imperial power founded on humanitarian convictions. Rees, for example, characterises sailors in this context as guided by an unconscious humanitarianism--'inflexibly xenophobic, unthinkingly racist yet dying in their thousands to save individuals with whom they had nothing in common but humanity.' 19 Even then the navy could not fully stop the supply so long as demand for slaves and legal protection for slave traders existed in the Americas. 25 And yet in spite of the various complications, between 1808 and 1867 the navy intercepted more than 1,600 slave ships carrying approximately 160,000 slaves bound for the Americas. 26 Naval suppression further proved a deterrent to the trade by increasing costs and risks. In most likely curbing the growth of the industry, it effectively prevented hundreds of thousands of Africans' undergoing the trauma of the Atlantic crossing and enslavement in the Americas. 27 This is not necessarily to say that these same Africans won freedom thanks to the The British navy's campaign to suppress the Atlantic slave trade ran for more than half a century, and in that time it directly impacted upon several nations and peoples of Africa, Europe, and the Americas. It is a history of hemispheric proportions. Far from attempting comprehensive coverage, the present study works toward the objectives that I have outlined above through detailed discussion of particular issues, regions, and time-frames. We have focused almost exclusively on British naval operations, and much of our discussion is centred on activities in and around the West African coast, which was the centre-ground of preventive action. Further research may profitably look at the anti-slave-trade squadrons despatched by the navies of other nations, both in terms of their direct engagements with the slave trade and in their interrelationship with the dominant, British presence, and at the work of other British squadrons beyond West Africa. 34 In view of the danger of 'maritimization' of the history of transatlantic slavery, which in truth stemmed from and shapedindustrial centres far removed from the ports of the Atlantic world, researchers need also to trace deeper-lying metropolitan connections to the post-1808traffic. 35 This is not to mention the 'many middle passages' and other anti-slave-trade activities beyond the Atlantic world, including (but not limited to) the campaigns against the Indian-ocean slave trade, the Swahili-Arab slave traffic across the Sahara to North Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and India, and the trafficking of indentured labourers from the Pacific Islands to Queensland, Australia. 36 The subject is practically inexhaustible, and doubtless future studies of anti-slave-trade operations at different historical junctures and geographical loci-the many ships, ports and courts that comprise this history-will complicate as well as corroborate the arguments advanced here.
We submit this collaborative venture as a new history of slave-trade suppression, not the final one, and a collective intervention in animportant episode in the histories of slavery, empire, and nineteenth-century Britain. 
